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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
On July 1, 2006, a man was allegedly beaten and robbed while showing an
apartment to two other men. Four suspects were charged in the case-the

alleged

mastermind, the two alleged assailants, and, Sheldon Stone, the alleged driver.
Ultimately, one of those four, the alleged mastermind, "rolled" on his co-defendants and
took a plea deal that garnered him a "rider."
Based on the statements of the alleged mastermind, Mr. Stone was charged with
three felonies: (1) criminal conspiracy; (2) aiding and abetting battery with intent to
commit a serious felony (robbery); and (3) aiding and abetting robbery. At Mr. Stone's
trial, the State's key witness was the alleged mastermind, who not only placed
Mr. Stone at the scene of the formation of the alleged conspiracy, but also testified that
Mr. Stone overheard the planning of the alleged attack and drove the two assailants to
the scene of that alleged attack.

Ultimately, the jury found Mr. Stone guilty of all

charges, and the district court imposed concurrent unified sentences of twelve years,
with three years fixed (although it retained jurisdiction over Mr. Stone).
Mr. Stone now appeals. On appeal, he contends that all three of his convictions
should be vacated because the accomplice testimony used to convict him (that of the
alleged mastermind) was not corroborated by any other evidence tending to connect
him to the alleged crimes, as is required under I.C. § 19-2117.
In response, the State contends that the alleged mastermind's testimony was, in
fact, corroborated.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.8-11.)

The State argues that it was

corroborated by the testimony of the detective who interrogated Mr. Stone, as well as
the two alleged assailants. (Respondent's Brief, pp.9-11.)
The purpose of the present Reply Brief is to address the latter assertion-the
State's claim that the alleged mastermind's testimony was corroborated by the
testimony of the two alleged attackers. As is discussed in detail below, the State's
argument fails because the corroboration requirement for accomplice testimony cannot
be met with the testimony of other accomplices.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinqs
The factual and procedural histories of this case were previously articulated in
Mr. Stone's Appellant's Brief. Accordingly, they are not repeated herein.

ISSUE
Can Mr. Stone's convictions stand where the accomplice testimony upon which they are
based was not corroborated by any other evidence tending to connect Mr. Stone to the
charged offenses?

ARGUMENT
Mr. Stone's Convictions Cannot Stand Because The Accomplice Testimonv Upon
Which Thev Were Based Was Not Corroborated BVAny Other Evidence Tendina To
Connect Mr. Stone To The Charaed Offenses
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Stone argued that there is no evidence, independent
of the testimony of Jeremy Sanderson (the supposed mastermind of the alleged attack
on Douglas Griffith and, therefore, an alleged accomplice of Mr. Stone) tending to
connect Mr. Stone to the alleged attack on Mr. Griffith. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-6, 1314.) He further argued that, under I.C. § 19-2117, which states that "[a] conviction
cannot be had on the testimony of an accomplice, unless he is corroborated by other
evidence, which in itself, and without the aid of the testimony of the accomplice, tends to
connect the defendant with the commission of the offense," his convictions cannot stand
because Mr. Sanderson's testimony was not corroborated in any way. (Appellant's
Brief, pp.13-16.)
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Stone pointed out that only four witnesses, in addition
to Mr. Sanderson, testified-Dustin

Bailey (one of the alleged attackers), Tyler Wall (the

other alleged attacker), Mr. Griffith, and Detective Rocky Cronquist (the detective who
interrogated Mr. Stone). (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) He pointed out that, of these four
witnesses, Mr. Griffith failed to connect Mr. Stone to the alleged attack and, thus could
not have corroborated Mr. Sanderson's testimony for purposes of section 19-2117, and
that Mr. Bailey and Mr. Wall were both alleged to have been accomplices themselves
so, even if they had implicated Mr. Stone (which they did not), their testimony could not
have corroborated Mr. Sanderson's testimony for purposes of section 19-2117 either.
(Appellant's Brief, p.14.)

He then went on to argue that Detective Cronquist's brief

testimony did not satisfy the standard of section 19-2117, as it did not actually connect
Mr. Stone to the alleged offenses against Mr. Griffith. (Appellant's Brief, pp.14-16.)
In response, the State offers two arguments in support of its claim that
Mr. Sanderson's claim was sufficiently corroborated within the meaning of section
19-2117: first, Detective Cronquist's testimony satisfied the corroboration requirement of
section 19-2117 because it sufficiently connected Mr. Stone to the alleged attack on
Mr. GrifTith (Respondent's Brief, pp.9-10); second, the testimony from the other two
accomplices-Mr.

Bailey and Mr. Wall-also

satisfied the corroboration requirement of

section 19-2117 (Respondent's Brief, pp.10-I I ) . In support of the latter proposition, the
State argues that, even though Mr. Bailey and Mr. Wall are themselves accomplices,
there is no danger that they falsely incriminated Mr. Stone because they actually
testified on his behalf. (Respondent's Brief, pp.10-11.) In support of this argument, the
State relies on a single case, published in 1963, from an intermediate appellate court
from California. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 10-1I.)
With regard to the State's first argument-that

Detective Cronquist's testimony

adequately corroborated Mr. Sanderson's testimony-that

argument was adequately

addressed in Mr. Stone's Appellant's Brief and, therefore, no reply is necessary.
However, the State's second argument-that

the testimony of the other accomplices,

Mr. Bailey and Mr. Wall, adequately corroborated Mr. Sanderson's testimony-requires
additional discussion. For the reasons set forth below, this argument from the State is
without merit.
First, in arguing that the testimony of one accomplice, Mr. Sanderson, was
corroborated by the testimony of two other accomplices, Mr. Bailey and Mr. Wall, the

State fails to mention that there is a long line of authority in ldaho standing for the
proposition that one accomplice cannot corroborate another accomplice's testimony for
purposes of section 19-2117. As early as 1924, in State v. Gillurn, 39 ldaho 457, 228 P.
334 (1924), a case interpreting the (identical) predecessor to section 19-2117, the ldaho
Supreme Court held as follows:
Under this statute one accomplice cannot corroborate another so as to
obviate the requirement that there must be corroboration by other
evidence which in itself and without the aid of the testimony of the
accomplice or accomplices, tends to connect the defendant with the
commission of the offense. There can be no conviction upon the
testimony of accomplices alone, no matter how many there may be, if their
testimony is not corroborated by evidence apart from accomplice
testimony.
Gillurn, 39 ldaho at -,

228 P. at 334. Although Gillurn is now an old case, it has not

been relegated to history's dustbin. In 1954, in State v. Rose, 75 ldaho 59, 267 P.2d
109 (1954), the Supreme Court again held, this time with regard to the current
codification of the relevant statute, that one accomplice cannot corroborate another:
The evidence required to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice,
before a conviction can be had, is not furnished by the testimony of
another accomplice. If two or more accomplices testify the same
corroboration is required as if there were only one. An accomplice can
neither corroborate himself nor another accomplice sufficiently to comply
with the requirements of the statute.
Rose, 75 ldaho at 64, 267 P.2d at 112. And indeed, Rose continues to be cited for this
proposition.

See, e.g., State v. Mack, 132 ldaho 480, 483, 974 P.2d 1109, 112

(Ct. App. 1999) (citing Rose for the proposition that the corroboration requirement of
section 19-2117 "cannot be fulfilled by the testimony of another accomplice"); State v.
Brooks, 103 ldaho 892, 904, 655 P.2d 99, 111 (Ct. App. 1982) (citing Rose for the
proposition that "[aln accomplice can neither corroborate himself nor another
accomplice to sustain a conviction within the requirements of I.C. § 19-2117"); Sfate v.

Wilson, 93 Idaho 194, 200, 457 P.2d 433, 439 (1969) (quoting the relevant portion of
Rose and holding that, in an appropriate "factual situation, the jury should be apprised
of this rule"). In light of this authority, which the State has not even acknowledged,
much less provided a valid reason to have overruled, the State's argument ought to be
rejected outright.
Second, insofar as the State's present argument comes down to a claim that
merely being an accomplice' does not make one an "accomplice" within the meaning of
section 19-2117 andlor Rose and its progeny, where the accomplice is called as a
witness by the defendant or where the accomplice testifies favorably for the defendant
at trial, the State's argument is utterly illogical. Such a claim overlooks the reality that
no defendant can know for certain what the accomplice will say once called to the
witness stand and, therefore, he should not be deemed to have forfeited the protection
of section 19-2117 just because he called a witness who may or may not falsely
implicate him. Indeed, the State's own brief illustrates this point. While the State
argues that the testimony given by Mr. Bailey and Mr. Wall "was offered by Stone for the
sole purpose of helping him," the State then turns around and argues that this testimony
corroborates the State's theory of Mr. Stone's guilt because "both Bailey and Wall . . .
testified that he was with them on that day and drove to the apartments and waited in
the car."* (Respondent's Brief, p.10.) The State's argument is also illogical in that it

' In its Respondent's Brief, the State concedes that "Bailey and Wall were undoubtedly
accomplices." (Respondent's Brief, p.10.)
'The State's claim that "Bailey and Wall . . . both testified that he [Mr. Stone] . . . drove
to the apartments," supported by a "see generally" citation to a 51-page section of the
trial transcript (see Respondent's Brief, p.10), is false. In fact, as was noted in
Mr. Stone's Appellants' Brief (p.3), according to both Mr. Bailey and Mr. Wall, Mr. Bailey

ignores the fact that an accomplice's testimony will often be mixed in its effect-in
ways favoring the defendant, and in other ways harming in the defendant-as

some

it was in

this case. Thus, if the State's argument is adopted, in cases such as this one, the
appellate court will be left in the difficult position of trying to determine which party is
most favored by the accomplice's testimony-a

necessarily subjective and imprecise

task.
Third, if the State is trying to argue that an accomplice is not truly an
"accomplice" if called to testify by the defense or if he provides testimony somewhat
favorable to the defense, then that is an argument that the State should have made
below. The record discloses that the district court specifically concluded, and instructed
the jury, that Mr. Sanderson, Mr. Bailey, and Mr. Wall were all "accomplices."
(R., p.147.) Further, the district court instructed the jury that "[a] person may not be
found guilty based solely on the testimony of accomplices. . . . There must be evidence,
other than testimony of accomplices, that tends to connect the defendant with the
commission of the crime. . . . [Alnd it must not come from the testimony of other
accomplices." (R., p.147 (emphasis added).)3 Since the jurors are presumed to have
followed the district court's instructions, State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 317, 127 P.3d
212, 220 (Ct. App. 2005), and, thus, could not have rested their verdicts on any
corroboration that might have been supplied by the testimony of Mr. Bailey or Mr. Wall,
the State has now missed any chance it may have had to try to justify the guilty verdicts

was the one who drove. (Tr., p.269, Ls.23-25 (Mr. Bailey's testimony that he drove),
.279, Ls.7-9 (same), p.310, Ls.7-12 (Mr. Wall's testimony that Mr. Bailey drove).)
'The State had no objection to these instructions (see Tr. p.59. L.19 - p.60, L.7. p.343,
Ls.9-15), and certainly has not appealed them.

based on its argument that Mr. Sanderson's testimony was corroborated by the
testimony of Mr. Bailey and/or Mr. Wall.
Fourth, the lone case relied upon by the State for its present argument-a

1963

case from an intermediate appellate court in California, People v. Fuqua, 35 Cal. Rptr.
163 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963)-is

very distinguishable from this case. That case

apparently did not involve a statute providing that a defendant cannot be convicted
solely on the basis of accomplice testimony, as this case does; rather, that case
involved a defendant's claim that the trial court should have, on its own motion,
instructed the jury "that the testimony of an accomplice ought to be viewed with
distrust." Fuqua, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 166. The Fuqua Court declined to find that the trial
court had erred in failing to so instruct the jury-in

part, because, as the State points

out, the accomplices were not prosecution witnesses and actually tended to corroborate
the defendant's version of events, but also because the four co-defendants were all
tried to together such that, to have singled out three of the co-defendants and instructed
the jury to view their testimony skeptically would have been extremely prejudicial to
those co-defendants. Id.
Fifth, the State's present argument was implicitly rejected by the ldaho Court of
Appeals in Brooks, supra. In Brooks, four individuals-McLenna,
Brooks-were

Esquivel, Wolf, and

implicated in a murder. Brooks, 103 ldaho at 895, 655 P.2d at 102. At

Brooks' trial, McLenna testified at the behest of the prosecution, and Esquivel testified
at the behest of the defense. Id. at 903-04, 655 P.2d at 110-11. At the conclusion of
the trial, the defendant requested that the jury be instructed that Esquivel was an
accomplice, such that his testimony could not be used to corroborate the testimony of

McLenna (which testimony the defense felt was not otherwise sufficiently corroborated
under section 19-2117); however the requested instruction was refused. Id. On appeal,
the district court's decision was affirmed-not

because Esquivel was a defense witness

and somehow could not have truly been an accomplice within the meaning of Rose, but
because under the facts of the case, the question of whether Esquivel was factually an
accomplice had no clear answer and, therefore, was a jury question. Id. at 904-05, 655

P.2d at 111-12. Thus, the Court of Appeals implicitly recognized in that case that the
jury could have found even a defense witness to be an accomplice within the meaning
of Rose.
In light of the foregoing, this Court should reject the State's contention that
Mr. Sanderson's testimony was sufficiently corroborated by other accomplices.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in Mr. Stone's Appellant's
Brief, Mr. Stone respectfully requests that this Court vacate his convictions and acquit
him of all charges.
DATED this 2"dday of June, 2009.
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